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Though it has foundations in many of the same political theoretical writings, German 
foderalismus has never quite meant the same thing nor functioned in the same way as 
American federalism. As a result, the German political system has generally been 
much more unitary than its American counterpart despite both being termed 
federations. This was especially true in the post-war reconstructed German Federal 
Republic. Unlike the American system at the same time, the German Federation 
remained mostly unchanged throughout the 50s, 60s, and 70s. With the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in I 989 and the subsequent German reunification, though, the country's 
federal system has been placed under a variety of stresses, which have exacted a toll 
on the classical German unitary federalism. This thesis seeks to examine the 
historical evolution of federalism in the German nation, concentrating primarily on 
the time from the formation of the Federal German Republic through reunification 
and into pres~nt day. This assessment will concentrate on the tangible effects of 
institutional reform (and sometimes non-reform) on federal intergovernmental 
relations, especially from the perspective of the Lander, or states. Several recent 
attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, at constitutional reform will be 
considered in light of public policy formulation models especially the multiple 
streams frameworks. Along the way, comparisons will be drawn to America's own 
federal system and its evolution through the history of the United States. Assessing 
these similarities and differences, the thesis closes by drawing some conclusions as to 
the current state and future direction of the German federal system as we near the 
twentieth anniversary ofreunification. German federalism, it seems, has been a 
pragmatic outcome of cultural and historical regionalism applied to political realities 
throughout history. Evolutions in the German federal design have come on the heels 
of enormous institutional changes as a result of wars or major regime changes. This 
did not happen following the German reunification, which has resulted in a stagnation 
of federal evolution which poses major challenges to the Federal German Republic as 
it celebrates sixty years of existence. 
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Introduction 
Germany has a long and varied history. Both the American term federalism 
and its German counterpart Foderalismus are derived from the Latin wordfoedus, 
meaning alliance or contract.' Despite shared etymology, and even though it has 
foundations in many of the same political theoretical writings, Germanfoderalismus 
has never quite meant the same thing as American federalism. As a result, the 
German political system has generally been considered much more unitary than its 
American counterpart despite both governments being termed federations. This 
unitary character of the German system was especially true in the post-war 
reconstructed German Federal Republic. Unlike the American system at the same 
time, the German Federation remained mostly unchanged throughout the 1950s, 60s, 
and 70s. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent German 
reunification, though, the country's federal system has been placed under a variety of 
stresses, which have exacted a toll on the preconditions which helped form German 
unitary federalism in the first place. The result has been an increasing call for reform 
of the federal system of intergovernmental relations, with some, albeit limited and 
incremental, success. 
This thesis seeks to understand the evolution of federalism throughout 
German history, with a particular emphasis on the past half century. Following a brief 
Deutscher Bundesrat, "Federalism" [Web site] (Berlin: Deutscher Bundesrat); available from 
<http://www.bundesrat.de/nn _ 11004/EN/funktionen-en/inhalte/1-Foederalismus-en.html>; 
accessed 7 April 2009. 
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introduction of the German political system, I will undertake a historical review of 
development ofGermanfoderalismus, culminating in an assessment of recent reforms 
( or attempted reforms, as the case may be) within several major public policy and 
intergovernmental frameworks, offering finally a prognosis for the future of federal 
reform as Germany moves further into a federalized Europe. Throughout the thesis, 
where relevant, comparisons will be drawn to similar and contrasting theories and 
events in the American federal experience. 
The German Political System 
To gain an understanding of the complex German federal system and make 
any meaningful comparisons of German and American intergovernmental relations, it 
is first important to have at least a rudimentary understanding of the most important 
German political institutions, especially vis-a-vis their American counterparts. 
Germany's government is characterized as a federal parliamentary republican 
form of government. The Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and, or Federal Republic of 
Germany embodies many of the same Montesquieuian ideas of the separation of 
powers that are seen in the American government, with both horizontal and vertical 
separation of governing powers. At the federal or Bund level power is divided, much 
like in the U.S., between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of 
government. The executive branch consists of the Bundesprasident, or Federal 
President, who is the primarily ceremonial head of state, elected every five years by 
8 
the Federal Assembly made up of the Bundestag and state delegates representing the 
legislatures of the various Lander. The head of government and chief executive is the 
Bundeskanzler ( or in the current case of Angela Merkel, the Bundeskanzlerin) or 
Federal Chancellor and is chosen by Bundestag from among its elected members, 
much like the prime minister of England. 
As a parliamentary system, the German legislative branch is made up of two 
houses, the Bundestag, or Federal Diet, and the Bundesrat, or Federal Council, which 
are elected differently and provide different representation than the American houses 
of Congress. While Bundestag is considered a parliament, the method of electing its 
deputies is classified as a mixed member proportional representation system, 
attempting to combine the benefits of the straightforward proportional representation 
system with the those of a first-past-the-post, district-based representation system like 
in the United States. Approximately half of the deputies are elected by and represent 
a specific district. Separately, all political parties which receive more than five 
percent of the national vote are entitled to seat deputies in the Bundestag. After the 
single-seat constituencies are elected, parties are assigned_ a number of open seats so 
that when added to the constituency seats wqn in district elections, the total number 
of seats each party has matches the proportion of the national vote they received. 
2 There are 299 single-seat constituencies which ideally make up half of the Bundestag's minimum 
498 seats. Because some parties may win more single-seat constituencies than their proportion of 
the national vote would dictate though, "overhang seats" may be allocated. These parties are 
allowed to keep those constituency seats but an equal number of open seats are distributed among 
the parties garnering the minimum five percent so that 498 seats are distributed proportionally 
among these parties. 
9 
These seats are filled from a party list of candidates, some of whom may also have 
been elected to their local constituency seat, in which case the party is able to appoint 
deputies further down their list. This mixed member system allows citizens to cast 
two votes in national elections, one for a specific candidate in their constituency and 
one for a national party. 
The judicial branch of the federal government is composed of a number of 
different courts housed around the country, the two most of important of which are 
based in Karlsruhe. The Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), or Federal Court of Justice, is the 
highest court in the country for civil and criminal jurisdiction. Decisions of the 
Bundesgerichtshofcan only be overturned by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerjG), 
or Federal Constitutional Court, which has the ultimate ability to rule on issues of 
constitutionality.' Though the lower BGH assumes some responsibilities of court of 
last resort that might in the US be associated with the Supreme Court, with the respect 
to constitutional issues, the BVerfG is the primary parallel institution to the United 
States Supreme Court. The Bundesverfassungsgericht is composed of sixteen judges 
sitting in two separate eight-judge Senates. Much like in the Supreme Court, whether 
a case raises a legitimate constitutional question to be heard by the court can be 
decided by smaller three-judge panels or en bane. The judges of the Constitutional 
Court are not appointed to life terms, like American Supreme Court justices, but 
3 "The Federal Court of Justice," [Web site] (Bundesgerichtshof, July 2008); available from 
<http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/docs/brochurebgh_2008.pdt>; accessed 12 April 2009. 
rather are elected, half by the Bundestag, half by the Bundesrat, in a process rather 
similar to the American justices' congressional confirmation, to single, twelve-year 
terms.4 
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While the division of powers at the Bund level play some part in the 
operations of the federal system, what truly characterizes German federalism is the 
division ( and sharing) of powers across the vertical levels of government and how 
they affect a complex system of intergovernmental relations. The Bundesrepub/ik 
Deutsch/and consists of at 16 Bundeslander (Lander for short) or federal states. 
Thirteen of these are characterized as Flaechenlander, or area states, in contrast to the 
three Stadtstaaten, or city states, of Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen. The states vary 
widely in population, size, density and geography. Each of the Lander possesses a 
popularly elected diet from which the Ministerprasident, the state minister president 
or prime minister, is chosen. 
The Centrality of the Bundesrat 
The Bundesrat, or Federal Council, often colloquially referred to as the 
Landerkammer (states chamber) is not an upper legislative house in the sense of the 
United States Senate or even the House of Lords in England. 5 Rather, it is a sort of 
second chamber which represents the Lander in the federal government, which merits 
4 "The Bundesverfassungsgericht- Organization," [Web site] (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2009); 
available from <http://www.bverfg.de/en/organization/organization.html>; accessed 12 April 2009. 
5 Arthur Gunlicks, "German Federalism and Recent Reform Efforts," German Law Journal 06 
(2005): 1284, note I. 
I I 
special attention in this thesis precisely because it plays a central role in 
intergovernmental relations landscape of German politics. As opposed to the US 
Senate in which the states are indirectly represented by senators who are directly 
elected by the citizens of their respective states, the Bundesrat is actually composed 
of members of the state governments. Even before the passing of the Seventeenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, American Senators were chosen by state legislatures 
to represent them in Washington, whereas, in Germany, the state executive is 
represented in the Bundesrat: only the minister presidents and other state ministers 
may be seated in the Federal Council. Furthermore, the Bundesrat does not afford 
each Land equal representation as the Senate does states, instead assigning each Land 
three to six votes, depending on population. A state must cast its votes en bloc 
requiring state governing coalitions either to find a suitable compromise or abstain 
from the voting. 6 The unique position of the Bundesrat as a federal organ of the 
Lander cabinets places it inextricably in the center of any discussion about German 
federal and intergovernmental relations. 
The History of German Federalism 
Amongst the various peculiarities which distinguish the Germanic 
Empire, in its political constitution, from all other nations of Europe, 
one of the first is its being composed of several states, which when we 
consider the difference of their situation, their extent, internal 
6 "Bundesrat-Bundesrat members" [Web site] (Bundesrat, 2009); available from 
<http:/ /www.bundesrat.de/nn _ 11006/EN/organisation-en/mitgl ieder-en/mitglieder-en-inhalt.htm I>; 
accessed 12 April 2009. 
regulations and condition in general, seem to have no relation to each 
other, at least in no other respect than other European nations; yet, 
notwithstanding this, together they always form an entire body, subject 
to a common head, under one superior power. The origin of this very 
singular constitution may be traced in the most ancient history; for in the 
earliest ages Germany was inhabited by a variety of nations, which, 
although sprung from the same origin, as several tribes from on 
principal people, had each of them their own regulations, and enjoyed 
the most perfect liberty and independence. 7 
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The unique history of the German nation" meant that what would become 
known as federalism had been occurring to varying degrees throughout the Holy 
Roman Empire. Unlike in America, there is no focussing event which could be 
described as precipitating the genesis of German federalism. To that extent, as well, 
the political discourse that would begin in the eighteenth century in Germany, had a 
much more concrete foundation than the American debates which were positing what 
was, to the founding fathers, primarily a theoretical political form. Germany, on the 
other hand, had the quasi-federal experiences of the Hanseatic states, the Holy Roman 
Empire, and the Wilhelmine Era, among others, to look upon. To further analyze the 
current challenges facing German federalism, this thesis seeks first to understand the 
historical evolution of a system that has its origins in regional politics dating back 
more than a millennium. 
German political and legal writer Johann Stephan Piitter posited, in his 
seminal work investigating the development of German political organization, that the 
7 Johann Stephan PUiier, An Historical Development of the Present Political Constitution of the 
Germanic Empire, trans. Josiah Domford (London: T. Payne and Son, 1790), 1-2. 
8 Nation is used here in the cultural sense, as opposed to the political term 'state' with which nation is 
often confused in popular discourse. 
origins of the peculiar decentralized political organization of Germany in the late 
eighteenth century could be traced far back into the late pre-modern history of the 
13 
Germanic tribes. He recounts numerous ancient Roman historical documents which 
make reference to more than fifty Germanic nations, some of which have maintained 
German names derived from the old Latin, among them Riigen (from the Latin name 
Rugi) and Friesland (from the Latin Frisii).9 Piitter further described how the early 
Germanic nations united during times of war under one or another leader only to 
return to their respective independent affairs at the conclusion of the war. ID 
The evolution of the German regional identities continued from the beginning 
of the Holy Roman empire, at which point already several of the modern-day Lander 
were taking shape. Although not all geographically recognizable, the various political 
states of Saxony, Thuringia, and Bavaria were well established by the turn of the 
millennium. 11 Four-hundred years later, Wiirttemberg, Hessen, Brandenburg and 
Mecklenburg had joined as recognized princedoms, duchies, or earldoms. 12 By 1664, 
the Holy Roman Empire had been organized into a federation of states in which the 
federation had clear a clear mandate to protect and maintain law, defense, and peace 
across the territories. 13 It seems the various states had sacrificed some of their 
9 Piltter, An Historical Development of the Present Political Constitution of the Germanic Empire, 2. 
10 Ibid, 9. 
11 "Deutschland um das Jahr I 000" in Prof G. Droysens Allgemeiner Historitscher Handatlas, ed. 
Richard Andree (Bielefeld: Velhagen & Klasing, 1886) [Atlas online] available from 
<http://www.maproom.org/00/08/present.php?m=0022>; accessed 20 April 2009. 
12 "Deutschland im XV. Jahrhundert" Ibid. [Atlas] available from 
<http://www.maproom.org/00/08/present.php?m=0034>; accessed 20 April 2009. 
13 Joachim Whaley, "federal Habits: the Holy Roman Empire and the Continuity of German 
14 
sovereignty to a larger political entity which could better protect them from the 
political realities of existing in the center of a Europe dominated by warring empires. 
In other words, the Holy Roman Empire was a political union which served practical 
purposes while allowing its member states to maintain their identities. 
Umbach argues that the development of "federalism as a political category" in 
Germany began around the same time the political discourse was picking up in the 
American colonies. The historical emphasis on polycentric power structures, 
especially in the Holy Roman Empire provided the setting for this debate. The Holy 
Roman Empire, Joachim Whaley argues, was not weak and dysfunctional as 
maintained by mid-twentieth-century German historians, but rather quite adept at 
fulfilling its goal, maintaining peace and preventing despotism in the German 
nation. 14 Umbach writes, "[T]he Old Reich was in many ways a federal state - but it 
was not (yet) defined as such." 15 It was clear there was a history of federal-style 
political organization within the German nation which informed the enlightenment-
era political discourse. In response to the political developments of the day, Umbach 
continues, German political writers in the late 1700s, like Piitter, began to reassess the 
regional, polycentric German political history through the Jens of new intellectual 
ideas about political organization and devolution. This process has proven influential 
on most periods of German politics since then, providing well documented precedents 
Federalism," in German Federalism, ed. Maiken Umbach (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 18. 
14 Ibid, 18-19. 
15 Umbach, Maiken. "Introduction: German Federalism in Historical Perspective," in German 
Federalism, ed. Maiken Umbach (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 3. 
for smaller states and eventually Lander to invoke when fighting for regional 
autonomy. 16 
15 
To this extent, German federal history has produced a certain continuity, albeit 
not in any sense of continuous federal structure. Rather, German federal experiences 
have implanted a sort of political continuity, and pride, in the national memory, in 
which the periods of "federalism" seem to be the focal points. Maiken Umbach 
writes, 
German Foderalismus is not, and never has been, an abstract concept. It 
has no single founding document and no universal definition·. Its 
meaning evolved gradually, over many centuries .... [H]istory itself 
plays a central role in defining federalism in German minds. Indeed, 
federalism has become, for many, the central embodiment of the 
country's history, or at least of its positive (that is, anti-totalitarian) 
aspects. 17 
Federalism was not formalized in the annals of German political history, instead it 
occupied a place in the German psyche, a sort of political bewusstsein or 
consciousness. Obviously there have been German regimes that lacked anything but 
a fleeting resemblance to a federal structure, but this national memory of the "glory 
days" of federal states has always, it seems, played a role in reconstructing 
democratic regimes at appropriate points in history. 18 
In 1871, Otto von Bismark's incorporation of the German Empire as a 
federation of free-states, kingdoms, and other sovereign entities solidified federalism 
16 Umbach, "Introduction," 4. 
17/bid.,2. 
18 Ibid., 4-5. 
as a "mainstay of Germany's political and constitutional order."" Even at this point 
though, the adoption of federalism had less to do with a historical tradition of its 
application and more to do with the political power structures and realities which 
became apparent in the unification efforts of the previous decade. 20 Once again, 
federalism was adopted out of political pragmatism rather than ideological 
preference. 
16 
The Implications of "F.ederal" History and Historical Regionalism 
Federalism, in the German experience, has been built around the historical 
regionalism and the variety of cultural identities that come with the regions. 
Historical experiments in federal structure have accommodated both a regional and 
national identity, and, for the most part without hierarchy,'1 in contrast to the 
American colonial experience where, leading up to the Revolutionary war, colonists 
often considered themselves Virginians or New Yorkers first and Americans second. 
Still, the dual German identities resemble the subsequent development in the new 
American federal system of a concept of dual citizenship under which people 
consider themselves citizens of a state and the nation simultaneously. 
Continuing the investigation of German regional identity, Umbach discusses 
the dichotomy of American sociologist Theda Skocpol, created for cultural analysis in 
19 Alon Contino, "Federalism and the Heimat Idea in Imperial Germany," in German Federalism, ed. 
Maiken Umbach (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 70. 
20 Ibid, 72. 
21 Umbach, "Introduction," 5. 
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the social and political sciences. She posits two separate categories: "cultural idioms" 
and "political ideologies." German regional identities, both historic and modern-day, 
are cultural idioms in Skocpol's taxonomy. Bavarian, Swabian, Prussian, or Saxon 
identities, to name a few, have played, and continue to play a major role in the 
evolving saga of German federalism. Even the German language can be seen in a 
federal sense: each region or Land had its own dialect, while Hoch Deutsch or High 
German was the formalized, region-neutral language understood across the German 
nation.22 Germany experienced a revival of regionalism in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries that was rather peculiar within the rest of Europe, and yet, 
regionalism cannot alone explain the political proclivity for federalism. France 
experienced a similar regional resurgence in the nineteenth century, yet the French 
state continues to be one of the most unitary in Europe. Thus, we can conclude that 
the German regional identities have played a necessary, but not sufficient role in the 
development of German federalism. Returning to Skocpol's dichotomy, there must be 
also an element of political ideology which influenced federalism in Germany. At 
various points in German history when a new state was being built, political discourse 
tended to be very historically minded, and so the cultural idiom of historical 
regionalism actually informed political ideologies: the importance of regional 
identities coalesced with the political realities of the day, under which a unitary state 
may have been impossible to form. 
22 Umbach, "Introduction," 6. 
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Historians have, at a various times, pointed out that German federalism lacks a 
concrete definition or foundational document to which it is tied. Umbach and her 
colleagues argue that the lack of specificity associated with the term federalism was, 
contrary to popular belief, a primary reason for the success of federalism as a guiding 
principle in German politics. Rather than be restricted by a formalized document or 
definition, federalism in the German experience has been molded and formed to fit 
practical needs of various chapters in history.23 As mentioned above, the German 
historical regionalism was expressed in practical form through the federal structures, 
and especially in light of pertinent contemporary political conditions. We can see this 
manifested in the decision of Bismark to unify Germany in 1871 under a federal 
structure, of the western Allies to combine their occupational zones into a federal 
republic following World War II, and of Chancellor Helmut Kohl to reunify the 
eleven Lander of West Germany with the six Lander of East Germany, rather than to 
combine two countries.24 These sorts of occurrences, what may be termed "pragmatic 
federalism," seem to constitute a recurring theme in the development of German 
federalism, and are highlighted throughout this thesis. Even during the Nazi regime, 
although federalism was decried as dividing the single German people, and formally 
abolished, it remained in practice throughout the Third Reich. It continued to serve a 
practical purpose in the dynamics of institutional competition as and a rhetorical 
23 Umbach, "Introduction," 5. 
24 Ibid, 7. 
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purpose in the Nazi promotion of Stammesbewusstsein. Again, regionalism holds a 
special place in the cultural idioms of Germans, but the political system of federalism 
is still for the most part a practical manifestation. There is no historical attachment to 
or national pride associated with federalism as much as federalism embodies or at 
least allows Germans to maintain their regional identities while defending against 
authoritarian politics which have plagued the German nation on several occasions 
through their history. 
Furthermore, in a comparative sense, an argument can be made that the 
German lack of definitional specificity is not so unlike the American experience. 
Especially during the American founding, the definition of federalism was so inexact 
that, by the drafting of the Constitution, the term "Federalist" was applied to those 
statesmen who argued for a stronger centralization of powers in the national 
government while "Anti-Federalists" were those who called for a weaker central 
government with considerable sovereignty reserved to the states. 25 Moreover, the 
principal documents of American government say very little about federalism. The 
Federalist and Anti-Federalist papers published around the time of the Constitutional 
Convention debated at great lengths the virtues and downfalls of federalism in theory, 
but while many of the concepts debated were subsequently incorporated in the 
Constitution, none of the words 'federal', 'federalism', or 'federation' appear anywhere 
25 Martin Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic Republic (Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock 
Publishers, Inc., 1981 ), 25. 
20 
in the final document. 
This observation draws a stark contrast to the German Grundgesetz, the 
official English translation of which contains the word 'federation' an incredible 164 
times. This is the manifestation of the difference in the American and German ideas 
of federalism which were promulgated from the beginning of this thesis. American 
federalism is an abstract idea which informs the design of the political system. Its 
ideals existed outside of a particular political regime, in the political writings and 
discourse of various intellectuals, and thus needed not be, or perhaps even could not 
be enumerated in the Constitution. German federalism, on the contrary, is, and 
always has been, almost entirely one and the same with the contemporary political 
system, thus the omnipresence of related terms in the much lengthier Grundgesetz. 
Modern-day German and the Adoption of Cooperative Federalism 
Immediately following Germany's surrender in 1945, regionalism once again 
found its way into the political organization of the country, beginning on a crude level 
with the division of Germany into four occupational zones of the Allied Powers. 
Even before the incorporation of the two post-war German sovereign states, Lander 
were established as political actors in the rebuilding process26 . While some of these 
were modern-day constructions, many of the new Lander approximated historical 
kingdoms, princedoms and states such as Bavaria, Baden, Hanover, Saxony and 
26 Roland Stunn, "The Federal System: Breaking through the Barriers of Interlocking Federalism?" in 
Institutions and Institutional Change in the Federal Republic of Germany, ed. Ludger Helms (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), I 06. 
21 
Prussia, som~ even maintaining the historical names. Thus historical regionalism was 
once again reborn. Though abolished less than three years after the formal 
incorporation of the German Democratic Republic, the five Lander which would 
' 
make up the GDR had already played important roles in the years immediately 
following the end of World War II, holding elections and sending representatives first 
to the people's congress which would officially establish the GDR and draft its 
constitution, and sitting in the Landerkammer, or States Chamber until their 
dissolution into 14 Bezirke in 1952.27 Certainly unbeknownst to anyone at the time, 
this short period ofregional activism would play an important role in the reunification 
efforts nearly 40 years later. 
In establishing a sovereign state from their combined occupation zones, the 
Western allies quickly decided on a federal government structure. This was 
influenced in part by quickly growing influence of political parties in post-war 
occupied Germany. As mentioned, following German surrender and with the advent 
of allied occupation, German Lander reemerged as political entities with burgeoning 
party organizations. 
Within the occupied Lander, political parties would come to play a vital role 
in the formation of a new German democratic state. Vestiges of the pre-war political 
parties were quickly revived within these new states: the Sozial Demokratische Partei 
27 Mary Fulbrook, "Democratic Centralism and Regionalism in the GDR," in German Federalism, ed. 
Maiken Umbach (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 147. 
22 
(SPD) or Social Democratic Party, one of the oldest political parties in Europe, and 
the Christlieb Demokratische Union (CDU) or Christian Democratic Union, an 
agglomeration of pre-war center-right parties established in 1945 as an anti-Nazi 
party with Christian underpinnings. Parties were licensed by the Allied powers as 
long as their organizers had no former ties to the Nazi regime. Though working 
under the guidance of the occupying powers, the new parties would become the 
primary architects of the new Federal Republic. With the founding three years later 
of the Freie Demokratische Partei, or Free Democrats, the specter of Weimar 
Republic multi-party factionalism was raised, prompting the framers to contemplate 
ways to avoid the genesis of numerous small, weak, only marginally differentiated 
parties which had led to the Nazi rise of power in the 1930s. Rather than to exclude 
parties altogether from the primary law-making and administrative functions of 
government, the German framers did the opposite, incorporating political parties 
directly in to the new Grundgesetz or Basic Law as the primary representative organs 
of the people, not only during elections, but in the day-to-day operations of the 
Government. As will continue to be seen over the course of the following half-
century, it is doubtful that these decisions were made without at least a tinge of self-
interest on the part of the aspiring party leaders of the late 1940s. They sought to 
secure political power and relevance for themselves in the future of the Federal 
Republic. And so political parties were incorporated as an essential institution in the 
23 
German republic under Article 21 of the Grundgesetz which states that the parties are 
responsible for "forming the political will of the people."" 
This development in post-war Germany must be seen in stark contrast to the 
establishment of the United States, and the Constitutional Convention. The American 
framers were extremely wary of political parties: James Madison wrote in Federalist 
No. IO about the virtues of a large union with a relatively strong federal government 
as a protection against the dangers offaction.29 George Washington, the country's 
first president, in his 1796 farewell address, railed against the devastating 
factionalism which he believed would come with the establishment of formal political 
parties.30 Obviously, we must also acknowledge that, by the late 1940s, when 
Germany's new government was being contemplated, virtually all democratic 
governments, as weII as many non-democratic ones, possessed some sort of party 
system, but the extent to which the parties were directly incorporated into the political 
system in Germany was relatively unique, especially vis-a-vis the extra-constitutional 
existence of the American parties. 
Having agreed upon the form of government, the German framers moved to 
consider the basic tenets of the new government. Scholars seem to agree that the 
28 Gregg 0. Kvistad, "Parteienverdrossenheit? Whither the Gennan Party-State in the 1990s?" in The 
Federal Republic of Germany at Fifty, ed. Peter H. Merkl (New York: New York University Press, 
1999), 175. 
29 James Madison, "Federalist No. 10," in The Federalist Papers. ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: 
Penguin Putnam Inc., 1961), 45-47. 
30 George Washington, "Farewell Address," [Web site and database] (Yale University: The Avalon 
Project, 2008); available from <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/l 8th_century/washing.asp>; accessed I 9 
April 2009. 
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fundamental goal sought in the post-war government was the provision of common 
standards of living and uniform policy delivery across the federal territory. The point 
cannot be over-emphasized for the importance it would come to play in the 
development of the federal system over the following decades. Furthermore, in this 
respect, Charlie Jeffery argues, German federalism differed from most other federal 
systems, which were conceived first and foremost to promote and guarantee territorial 
diversity not uniformity.31 
Though debatable, this thesis takes the position that, like German federalism 
according to Jeffery's argument, American federalism, too, was not conceived as "a 
guarantor for territorial diversity." Americans had just dealt with a half-century of 
increasingly despotic unrepresentative monarchy so its political and intellectual 
leaders sought a system which they believed would prevent such an occurrence within 
a republican government (the rule of King George had been more of an external 
imposition of tyranny). Following the lengthy theoretical debates of the framers, it 
seemed that federalism was just that system. If it maintained or guaranteed territorial 
diversity, that was only a convenient secondary consequence of a system which first 
and foremost protected the rights of its citizens from despotism. Additionally, 
31 Charlie Jeffery, "German Federalism from Cooperation to Competition," in German Federalism, 
ed. Maiken Umbach (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 172-173. 
For Switzerland, generally accepted as the first nation after the United States to adopt a true a federal 
form of government in 1848, and Canada, which followed suit 1867, the argument for federalism as a 
"guarantor for territorial diversity" is readily apparent. The Swiss Federation incorporates 4 different 
geographically divided ethnic groups, and Canada, too, housed both anglophone and francophone 
cultures. 
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America in the 1780s was relatively devoid of territorial or cultural diversity to 
protect. Early French, Dutch, and other continental European settlers had been 
thoroughly Anglicized since England took control of the American colonies. To be 
sure, if there was significant territorial diversity to be guaranteed in post-
Revolutionary War America, it had certainly been overlooked by John Jay who 
remarked in Federalist No. 2, "I have ... often taken notice that Providence has been 
pleased to give this one connected country to one united people---a people descended 
from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, 
[ and] ... very similar in their manners and customs .... "32 In fact, one could argue that 
Germany in 1871 and 1949 had more territorial diversity than newly independent 
America, given the north-south religious cleavage between Protestants and Catholics 
as well as, in 1871 at least, significant Jewish populations in the north east areas of 
Prussia, Silesia, Posen, and other parts of modem-day Poland and Czech Republic. 
Again, Jeffery points out that despite the these territorial differences which 
federalism in other countries had been employed to foster and protect, federalism was 
to be employed in Germany to establish uniformity of conditions.33 To explain this 
irony, we should return to the dichotomy of Theda Skocpol discussed earlier. We 
have established that the historical regionalism and associated identities are cultural 
idioms in Skocpol's schematic, while the political ideology the framers were seeking 
32 John Jay, "Federalist No. 2," in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: Penguin 
Putnam Inc., 1961), 6. 
33 Jeffery, "German Federalism from Cooperatio~ to Competition," 172-173. 
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to establish was one of uniformity and consensus. Once again, federalism, now more 
unitary than in the past, seemed to be the most pragmatic way to reconcile regional 
identities (as opposed to territorial diversity) with uniform policy provision. 
Furthermore, with careful design, the political parties, and sovereignty, although 
limited, of the Lander, it was believed, would help prevent the authoritarian 
centralization of power in the future. 34 This second point even became somewhat of a 
public relations assertion for the Federal Republic to allay the fears of its European 
neighbors that a newly independent German country would, once again, pose a threat 
to their sovereignty. 
Under the newly established Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Grundgesetz, the federal government would be responsible for most policy making, 
leaving the administration up to the individual Lander. Still, even policy making at 
the federal level required the involvement and consent of the Lander via the 
Bundesrat. According to the Parliamentary Council deliberations, the bills requiring 
consent of the Lander was initially intended to be limited to 30 percent. It quickly 
became apparent that this had been a gross miscalculation. The Bundesrat had the 
constitutional power to veto any legislation which directly affected the Lander. As 
European integration increased in the second half of the twentieth century, the 
number of regulations promulgated by the Bund which impacted the Lander began to 
34 Charlie Jeffery, "Federalism: The New Territorialism," in Governance in contemporary Germany: 
the semisovereign state revisited, eds. Simon Green and William E. Paterson (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 78. 
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increase manyfold. 
Even in policy areas, such as education, where they were not dictated by the 
Bund, the Lander were, from the early days, coordinating their policies to ensure 
uniformity. These coordination efforts gave rise to so-called "subject matter 
brotherhoods"35 in which the federal and Land ministers met to coordinate policies 
that they would take back to their respective cabinets and legislatures. So it is clear 
that the establishment of a highly coordinated and cooperative system of 
politikverjlechtung, in English entanglement or interconnection, was not merely some 
authoritarian antidote accepted begrudgingly by the Lander, but rather a system which 
they very willingly helped solidify.36 The political party apparatus must also be given 
its due in this process: because the Land party organization in the first several decades 
of the Bundesrepublik exercised little independence from their national bureaus, the 
coordination of national party lines and policy further ossified the 
politikverjlechtung. 37 
Proponents of this system argue that a kooperativer Foderalismus, or 
cooperative federalism, is the only logical system with which to facilitate the ultimate 
goal of consensus-seeking and policy uniformity. The unitary nature of the 
cooperative federal design was accepted precisely because the post-war German 
populous valued the goal of uniformity of social welfare and living conditions above 
35 Gunlicks, "Gennan Federalism and Recent Refonn Efforts," 1292. 
36 Jeffery, "Federalism: the New Territorialism," 81. 
37 Stunn, "The Federal System," 109. 
the protection ofregional political interests or independence. 
Moving from Cooperative to Competitive Federalism 
The pursuit of common standards has become a highly contested goal. 
The implications of even trying to work collectively towards uniformity 
are increasingly unwelcome for many of the Lander .... The notion of 
collective action through cooperative structures to secure common goals 
now implies for any one Land a much greater degree of compromise of 
its political interests than it did in the West German past.38 
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Reunification of Germany drastically altered the political, social, cultural and, 
above all, economic landscape of the country in a very short period of time. It is 
difficult to imagine a similar set of strains which have been placed on the American 
system in such a short time. The closest comparison may be the onset of the Great 
Depression. This raises an interesting comparative question considering that the 
Great Depression precipitated perhaps the greatest short-term reform/evolution in 
American history. Beginning with President Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing 
proposal, the United States Supreme Court began to abandon a strict, dual federalism 
interpretation of the Constitution, allowing the federal government to assume broader 
powers to combat poverty and other social problems which were exacerbated by the 
depression. While it is both interesting and ironic to note that the U.S. sought to 
centralize its federalism under the strains of the 1930s, and Germany sought quite the 
opposite during its troubles in the early 1990s, the point remains that broad systemic 
stresses have historically led to attempts at reform - some successful, some not. 
38 Jeffery, "German Federalism from Cooperation to Competition," I 73. 
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Why has the classic politikverflechtung of German cooperative federalism 
fallen so out of grace? Several political commentators, including Charlie Jeffery" 
and Roland Sturm, 40 argue that with the changing political and economic landscape, 
the preconditions which led to the original adoption and subsequent strengthening of 
the cooperative federal system have, one by one, disappeared. The specifics of these 
preconditions vary from scholar to scholar, but several overarching themes are clear. 
First, in the post-war Republic, there was a necessity to coordinate policy 
closely in order to maximize the efforts to rebuild the German economic engine that 
had been thoroughly destroyed during World War II. The Wirtschqftswunder or 
economic miracle of the 1960s and 70s attest to the success of this strategy. But as 
the global economy experienced a slow-down with the thawing of the Cold War at the 
end of detente and with the beginning of Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika, the 
economic success which, through a sort of fiscal federalism, had "bought" the 
cooperation of the Lander in the politikverjlechtung system was threatened. With 
only minimal tax powers of their' own, the Lander were left to continue federally 
mandated programs with stagnating tax revenues from the federal government. Much 
like the crisis of the unfunded mandate in American politics around the same time, the 
Lander governments found this to be a difficult problem in maintaining the 
constitutionally required equal living conditions. 
39 Jeffery, "German Federalism from Cooperation to Competition," 175. 
40 Sturm, "The Federal System," 111 
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Second, economic success in the first few decades of the Bundesrepublik was 
contingent, in large part, upon the negotiating prowess of the federal government and 
its ability to forge economic agreements with other countries which would secure 
markets for Germany's growing export economy. With the advent of European 
economic integration in the 1980s, the importance of federal involvement in 
promoting German industry has declined. Especially with the formation of the 
European Economic Community, the implementation of the single European market 
and the eventual adoption of the Euro as a common currency, the Lander were no 
longer dependent on the Bund to help gain access to foreign markets.41 Consequently, 
the Lander have been less willing to accept federal domination in numerous economic 
policy areas since they are able to act without aid from the federation within the Euro-
zone. 
Third, the relative social and economic homogeneity which prevailed 
throughout the history of the West German federal republic42, and which, perhaps 
more importantly, simplified the goal of providing equal living conditions, was 
shattered by the accession of the East German Lander into the federation. After the 
territory change, as Charlie Jeffery wrote in 2005, "[Germany] has become far more 
diverse than it used to be. There is now a mismatch between the form of federalism 
41 Stunn, "The Federal System," 111-112. 
42 Jens Woelk, "Farewell to the 'unitary federal state'? Transfonnation and tendencies of the Gennan 
federal system," in The Changing Faces of Federalism, eds. Sergio Ortino et al. (New York: 
Manchester University Press, 2005), 175. 
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and the level of diversity of society. "43 The economic contrast between the rich, 
industrialized Lander of West Germany, such as Bavaria or North Rhine-Westphalia 
and the poor, rural ones, like Schleswig-Holstein in the north paled in comparison to 
vast differences between the same rich Lander and the poorest states of former East 
Germany. Furthermore, the citizens of East Germany had lived for half a century 
under vastly different social and economic conditions which complicated their 
integration into the culture of West German social capitalism. Germans from both 
East and West spoke of the "wall in our heads" after reunification, primarily a result 
of "the sudden merger of two incompatible political, economic, and social systems 
that had developed in the two Germanys between 1945 and 1990."44 This "inner 
separation" was often exacerbated by tales of Western German exploitation of cheap 
infrastructure and physical capital for quick profit, reminiscent of the Union 
"carpetbaggers" of the American post-civil war reconstruction era.45 
Fourth, the political parties of Germany have, since the 1980s, moved away 
from a hard and fast nation-wide party line. The growing need for independence of 
Land party organizations, emphasized by the increasing frequency in mid-term 
elections for citizens of a Land to oust the party for which they voted in the national 
election, has already begun to precipitate changes. Ruling Lander coalitions have 
increasingly voted in the Bundesrat based on regional interests rather than 
43 Jeffery, "Federalism: the New Territorialism," 85. 
44 Lewis Edinger and Brigitte Nacos, From Bonn to Berlin: German politics in transition (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998), 14. 
45 Ibid., 23. 
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coordinating with their party line or other same-party coalition-run Lander. 
Ironically, the increasingly frequent call for federalism reform has exacerbated this 
change, because the issues at stake in such a discussion cross every conceivable party 
line and cause Lander governments to align themselves across new cleavages. 
Additionally, the growth of "third parties" and their participation in numerous Land 
ruling coalitions has exacerbated differences between party policies at the state and 
national levels as more and more often parties in the Lander find themselves aligned 
with different coalition partners than their national party organization at the federal 
level.46 
It is rather clear that there has been increasing pressure, both from inside and 
outside of the political establishment, over the last two decades for reforms of the 
federal system. Many of those in favor ofreform would like to see a shift of 
responsibilities and areas of competence back to the Lander resulting in increased 
autonomy and independence in legislation and policy formulation. These proponents 
point at the American model of the states as "laboratories of innovation" as an 
example of success with this type of policy competition. 
This new fascination with Wettbewerbsflideralismus, or competitive 
federalism comes to a great extent as a result of the attempt by richer Lander to 
replace coordination and uniformity as national buzzwords with the concept of 
subsidiarity. Based on Catholic social thought, the promulgation of this principle, 
46 Jeffery, "Federalism: the New Territorialism," 84. 
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which argues that social issues and problems are best tackled by the smallest political 
institution possible", usually local entities, has unsurprisingly been spearheaded by 
the Bavarian government. 
The disentanglement of the Land and national political party stages has begun 
to alter the political landscape in such a way that will encourage some type of 
institutional reform, whether de facto, or through an amendment of the Grundgesetz. 
As previously mentioned, there has been an increasing trend for Land voters to oust 
the ruling party in midterm Land elections as a result of actions by the party at the 
Bund level. There is a growing disconnect between policy action in the federation 
and political consequences, as parties in the individual Lander bear the brunt of 
voters' dissatisfaction or disenchantment with politics in Berlin. 
De facto Federal Reform 
While formal institutional change in the shape of constitutional reform has 
failed numerous times, and been relatively ineffective when it has succeeded, German 
federalism has hardly been static over the past half century. Much like the American 
experience, constitutional rigidity has been circumvented by various de facto 
institutional changes. 
Both the American Constitution and the German Grundgesetz lay out rather 
extensive, and purposefully difficult to overcome, processes for undertaking 
47 Sturm, "The Federal System," 113. 
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constitutional reform. In this respect, in the United States, the federal constitution 
stands in stark contrast to those of the states; while the states have held more than 230 
conventions, adopted more than 140 separate constitutions and ratified over 6,000 
amendments, the federal government has not seen a single constitutional convention 
since the founding convention in Philadelphia, and has adopted only twenty-seven 
amendments. In the United States, as John Dinan points out, this constitutional 
rigidity has led to institutional reform or rather evolution outside of formal processes, 
through actions ( or inaction in some cases) of Congress, the President, or the 
Supreme Court.48 
Perhaps Germany will come to take heart in the American experience, 
especially since the German system not only has the constitutional hurdles but also a 
preponderance of political hurdles and entrenched interests to overcome. It would 
appear, with the decision in 1999 regarding fiscal equalization, among others, that the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht may be taking on a reformative role much like the 
Supreme Court has done in the United States. Still the extent to which the BVerjG 
can assume this sort ofrole is greatly limited by the extensive statutory characteristics 
of the Grundgesetz; especially vis-a-vis the American Constitution.49 The US 
Supreme Court has been able to promote judicial federalism primarily because of the 
laconic nature of the Constitution which left significant areas of policy up for judicial 
48 John Dinan, The American State Constitutional Tradition, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas, 2006), 1-2. 
49 Edinger and Nacos, From Bonn to Berlin, 48. 
review and interpretation. The Grundgesetz, on the other hand, goes into 
considerable detail, and at 146 articles and more than 25,000 words-many times 
longer than the Constitution-leaves little room for any considerable judicial 
interpretation. 
The Possibility of German Federal Reform 
A notable point which has become apparent in reviewing the history of 
35 
Germany's federal experiences, is the striking similarity between the historical 
evolution of federalism and Germany and the public policy model of punctuated 
equilibriums. The punctuated equilibriums model posits that political systems go 
through cycles of policy activity, with longer periods of relatively stagnant policies 
interrupted by short periods of innovative policy-making. 50 In Germany, a similar 
case is observed in periods of stability, especially with regard to political system, 
punctuated by short periods of upheaval, such as the Thirty-Years War in the early 
17th century, the wars of succession in many German states in the mid-1800s, and the 
two World Wars in the twentieth century. Specifically, most of the innovations and 
changes in German federalism have come as an authoritarian state disintegrated or 
was defeated and the rebuilding of a republican democratic system allowed 
significant flexibility in federal design. In the past century and a half, these changes 
have typically fallen relatively close, within 30 or 40 years of each other, beginning 
50 B. Guy Peters, American Public Policy: Promises and Performance (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 
2004), 49. 
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with the organization ofa federal German Empire in 1871, the founding of the 
Weimar Republic in 1919, and then the establishment of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in 1948. Now sixty years later, the Bundesrepublik has failed to make any 
major reforms to its political system which even remotely resemble the differences 
between the German Empire and the Weimar Republic or Weimar and the post-war 
Federal Republic. It might be argued that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
dissolution of the German Democratic Republic offered an opportunity for such 
change, but went unrealized because of the choice to incorporate the reestablished 
East German Lander into the extant Federal German Republic rather than establish a 
new state altogether. 
Prior iterations of German democratic federalism never survived long enough 
to have to cope with extreme changes in political circumstances. Instead, advances in 
federal design were precipitated by changes in the political system which allowed for 
innovation and evolution of federalism. At the point of reunification, the pattern of 
German federal evolution broke down. Previously, German federalism had been the 
result of a practical application of historic regionalism to the political realities of the 
day. In the several years surrounding German reunification, political leaders failed to 
recognize not only the major changes in political and economic circumstances it had 
and would precipitate, but especially the monumental challenge these changes posed 
to the fundamental policy goals of relatively equal living standards and uniform 
policy provision across the federation. What has resulted is the stagnation of the 
federal evolution in Germany, which has frustrated both political leaders and the 
public alike. 
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The political necessity of fundamental reform in the German federal system 
has by now become quite clear. Politikverdrossenheit, the disenchantment with 
politics, of the German public has grown to such epic proportion that reform has 
become an unavoidable topic in elections at every level of government. As it stands, 
cooperative federalism in the German governments has been primarily a procedural 
device to facilitate the regional and local provision of nevertheless nationally uniform 
policies and social conditions, as well as another institutional manifestation of the 
separation of powers. Competitive federalism, on the other hand, is much more of a 
theoretical concept under which regional autonomy encourages creativity in policy 
making. 51 If the German system is to move in the direction of an American-style 
competitive federalism, Sturm argues, a number of fundamental institutional changes 
are necessary. 
First, the federation must consider the implementation of Neugliederung, the 
process of redrawing Lander boundaries. This process has been undertaken 
previously in the Bundesrepublik, when, in 1952, the merger ofWiirttemberg-
Hohenzollern, Baden, and Wiirttemberg-Baden gave birth to the new southwestern 
Land of Baden-Wiirttemberg. The result of this process must be a sort of 
51 Sturm, "The Federal System," 114. 
demographic and economic gerrymandering, so that the various Lander are large 
enough and have sufficient economic capacity to compete not only with each other, 
but also with other regions in the modem, economically integrated European 
market. 52 
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Secondly, the design of the fiscal equalization system must be revisited in an 
attempt to increase Lander responsibility for its expenditures. Not only does the 
current financial system prevent the Lander from directly financing policy initiatives, 
eliminating any meaningful flexibility with regards to policy innovation, it also gives 
the Lander the wrong fiscal incentives. Because Lander with above-average income 
are required to transfer a significant portion (approximately one third in Bavaria) of 
their surplus income to raise poorer Lander to 95% of the national average, these 
Lander have little incentive to improve economic performances because they will 
reap a disproportionately small benefit. Poor lander, on the other hand, have little 
incentive to ensure judicious expenditures or increase economic competitiveness 
since improved fiscal outcomes merely reduce the transfers received through 
equalization.53 Certainly the absolute truth of these disincentives are as debatable as 
the economic theories on which they are based, but there is no doubt that the current 
design of fiscal equalization is incompatible with any efforts to promote policy 
competition amongst the lander. 
52 Sturm, "The Federal System," 114-115. 
53 Sturm, "The Federal System," 117. 
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Third, the politikverflechtung of the Lander and the Bund must be reduced so 
that both levels operate with more independence from one another. The joint 
decision-making which characterizes a majority of policy-making efforts should be 
trimmed back to allow more political autonomy for the Lander, whose parliaments 
have been increasingly marginalized with the growth of the number of joint tasks and 
federal framework legislation in which only the Lander executives have input via the 
Bundesrat. Any major step in the direction of disentanglement is hindered by one of 
the most stark contrasts between American and German federal systems. Both in the 
United States and Germany, there is often discussion of"concurrent powers," those 
powers shared between or exercised concurrently by both federal and state 
governments. The primary example of concurrent powers in the US is the power of 
taxation, one which is conspicuously Jacking in the German Lander. The absence of 
any significant taxing powers leaves the German states without any way to generate 
revenue from within the state. As a result, even in those policy areas which are still 
reserved to the Lander, legislation is constrained by the vertical and horizontal 
Finanzausgleich systems by which the federal government transfers tax revenues 
from its coffers back to the states and from richer Lander to poorer ones. 54 
Finally, related to the previous point, the Lander must work to recapture 
Bundesrat as a forum in which their preferences and interests can be asserted. 55 The 
54 Edinger and Nacos, From Bonn to Berlin, 54-55. 
55 Sturm, "The Federal System," 118. 
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Ltinderkammer has, since the inception of the Federal Republic, operated as venue for 
the political opposition to veto legislation introduced by the administration since it 
often lacks the power to do so in the Bundestag, a point which is emphasized by the 
historical increase in the number of vetoes when there are opposing majorities in the 
two houses. 56 The gradual expropriation of the Bundestag by party-coalition interests 
has only intensified the feeling of politikverdrossenheit, and the related 
parteiverdrossenheit, or party disenchantment, among the German public. 
It would be foolish to discuss necessary or ideal reform measures in the 
German federal system without also assessing the political and institutional feasibility 
of such reforms. J.W. Kingdon presented the multiple streams model of public policy 
analysis in 1984 to explain why certain issues and problems gain political prominence 
and are eventually translated into policy implementations while others become highly 
visible but do not result in any policy outputs and some fail even to gain much 
attention. Kingdon focusses on three distinct streams: the problem stream, the policy 
stream and the politics stream. The problem stream is closely associated with the 
public policy process of agenda setting. An issue must be identified as a problem, 
specifically one which can be affected by the policy-making process, for there to be 
any hope of action. The policy stream is intricately related to issues of policy 
innovation and diffusion and is a subtle modification of the earlier rather simplistic 
garbage can model, in which policy actors take ready-made policies and search for a 
56 Stunn, "The Federal System," 119. 
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problem for which the policy may be a solution. Finally, the politics stream focuses 
on the rational choice aspects of policy makers as well as other political actors and 
institutions and the perceived feasibility and benefits of solving specific problems." 
Recent reform attempts 
German reunification and all the previously discussed changes in landscape 
that resulted from it have had an enormous agenda setting effect by raising the public 
awareness of the need for institutional reform. Certainly the frustration of the public 
had been growing in the 1980s, but the addition of the economically and socially 
different eastern Lander further underscored the inability of the classic German 
cooperative federalism and politikverjlechtung to cope with new issues of economic 
downturn, globalization and an integrated Europe. Political gridlock following 
reunification as well as revelations of corruption and profiteering in East Germany's 
former Communist party so deepened the public disenchantment with the political 
system thatpolitikverdrossenheitwas named the "word of the year" in 1992 by a 
major German newspaper.58 
From 1993 to 1995 a number of small reforms were carried out regarding 
fiscal equalization and independence in the Lander. In addition to agreements on 
social service maintenance, railroad reform, and housing construction, 59 among other 
57 "Streams model," (Metagora) [Web site]; available from <http://www.metagora.org/training/ 
encyclopedia/streams.html>; accessed on 13 April 2009. 
58 Edinger and Nacos, From Bonn to Berlin, 62. 
59 "Die Vereinbarung Uber den Solidarpakt" ["The Agreement on the Solidarity Pact"], trans. Thomas 
Dunlap, (Archiv der Gegenwart, 1993) [Article online]; available from 
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things, the Solidarity Pact of 1993 obtained concessions from the federal government 
that it would bear a vast majority of the financial burden of reunification (nearly 90 
percent), though some of that would be financed by a 7.5% "solidarity surcharge" on 
income and corporate taxes. In exchange for the I 0% contribution of the Lander to 
the fiscal solidarity efforts, the portion of VAT revenues received by the states would 
go from 35 to 37% in 1993, financed by a rate hike of 1 % in January of 1993, and rise 
again to 44% in 1995.6° Furthermore, the Bundwould shoulder most of the former 
East's debt service burden.61 Although the Solidarity Pact could be seen as a small 
victory on the part of the Lander, the media was critical of the lack of true reform 
measures or political creativity in approaching the problems of reunification. Instead, 
the Zeit accused, the federal government had fallen back on debt spending to finance 
development efforts in the east.62 
In 1996, an ambitious plan was introduced to merge the governments of 
Berlin and the surrounding Brandenburg, in hopes that the move would precipitate 
sweeping neugliederung across the federation. Interestingly enough, the measure had 
been approved by the governments of both Lander and was positively received by the 
citizens of Berlin. A referendum in Brandenburg on the proposal, though, was 
roundly rejected by citizens of the rural Land. This failure stalled any further 
<http://gennanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Chapter3 _doc_ 7 _solidarity.pd!>, 1-2, accessed on 13 
April 2009. 
60 Arthur Gunlicks, "Gennan Federalism After Unification," Publius 24, no. 2 (I 994): 85. 
61 Ibid, 88. 
62 "The Agreement on the Solidarity Pact," 4. 
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territorial reform politicians had in mind. The issue continues to be pushed from the 
agenda as a new referendum planned for 2006 has now been delayed until 2013. 63 
The efforts of fiscal equalization and the Solidarity Pact were stymied by a 
1999 decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht which held that the current design of 
the fiscal equalization scheme was unconstitutional. The ruling required that the 
system be overhauled to make it more transparent and allowed the federal legislature 
until 2002 to design new guidelines which would go into effect in 2005.64 As a result 
of the decision, the federal government and Lander negotiated an extension of the 
Solidarity Pact, whose initial end date of 2005 would be hampered by equalization 
reform, all the way to 2019. 65 
The rich western Lander, especially Bavaria and Baden-Wiirttemberg, who 
had appealed the fiscal equalization scheme to the BVerfG in the first place, were not 
pleased with the idea that monetary transfers to the poor eastern states might continue 
for another two decades. As a result, they began calling for institutional reform, and 
drumming up popular support from their citizens and as well as other Lander 
governments for a more comprehensive statutory overhaul of the po/itikverjlechtung 
andjinanzausgleich systems. 
In October of 2003, following the March "Declaration ofLiibeck" by a 
63 Gunlicks, "Gennan Federalism and Recent Refonn Efforts," 1287. 
64 Arthur Gun!icks, A Major Operation or an Aspirin for a Serious Illness? The Recent Agreement 
Between the Federation and the lander on Financing the lander (Washington, DC: American 
Institute for Contemporary Gennan Studies, 2001); [Article online] available from 
<http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/ at-issue/ai-gunlicks.aspx> 
65 Gunlicks, "Gennan Federalism and Recent Refonn Efforts," 1288-89. 
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convention of Lander parliaments establishing the reform of federalism as a priority, 
the German houses of parliament inaugurated the Kommission von Bundestag und 
Bundesrat zur Modernisierung der bundestaatlichen Ordnung,66 or KOMBO for short, 
charged with the development of reform proposals to increase transparency, 
efficiency and more clearly define competencies of the federation and Lander. After a 
year of negotiations between the parties, the Lander and the Bund, led by CSU head 
and Bavarian Ministerpra~ident Edmund Stoiber and Franz Miintefering, the SPD 
faction leader in the Bundestag, the commission collapsed in gridlock over 
educational policy.67 
Following the early federal elections called by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder 
for 2005, the CDU/CSU and SPD were forced to form a grand coalition and elected 
Angela Merkel as the new Chancellor.68 Merkel quickly reiterated her support for 
federal reform and promised to resurrect the Federalism Commission and push 
through successful reform measures. On June 30'\ 2006, the most comprehensive 
reform of the Grundgesetz since its adoption in 1949 was passed by the Bundestag 
and Bundesrat.69 First, the amount of federal legislation to which the Bundesrat could 
object was effectively reduced. The new changes in the Grundgesetz, the German 
66 In English: the "Commission of the Federal Diet and Federal Council to Modernize the Federal-
State System," often shortened to simply Federalism Commission. 
67 Gunther Hega, "Solving the Gordian Knot: The Federalism Commission and the Reform of the 
German Federal System." (Article to be presented at a conference, Western Michigan University, 
2007), I 0, 17- I 8. . 
68 Arthur Gunlicks, "German Federalism Reform: Part One," German law Journal 08 (2007): 112. 
69 Ibid, 115. 
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government estimated, would reduce by one third the number of laws which would 
require Bundesrat approval to come into force. Several years later, the government 
claims to have done even better, saying that the number of consent-requiring bills has 
dropped from an average anywhere from 50 to 61 percent in the years following the 
1969 reforms which increased the politikverjlechtung in the first place, to 29.8 
percent of all legislation. 70 
The Lander, and especially their prime ministers, were compensated for their 
loss of power in the federal legislative process by being given the right to deviate 
(from the German abweichen) from federal legislative frameworks regarding 
administrative structure and procedures. In cases where this right was given, Lander 
would be allowed to pass their own regulations if they so desired. Interestingly 
enough, in what would appear to be nod toward the American model of "state 
laboratories of innovation" and an acknowledgment of the concepts of policy 
diffusion, the reform measure provided that, should a Land choose to deviate from 
federal frameworks, the federal regulations will be postponed for another six months 
to offer the other Lander an opportunity to adopt their own regulations, whether 
similar or not. 71 
Even though successful, reform efforts of 2006 and their resultant 
70 Deutscher Bundestag, Foderalismusreform und Grundgesetz (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 2007), 
12-14, my translation; [Government pamphlet]; available at 
<http://www.bundestag.de/interakt/infomat/ schriftenreihen/downloads/foedreform_download.pdt> 
accessed on 20 April 2009. 
71 Gunlicks, "German Federalism Reform: Part One," 119. 
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constitutional amendments have constituted little more than a trivial victory. For one, 
the two most important topics to the reform of intergovernmental relations were not 
even approached: fiscal equalization and territorial reorganization. 72 As a result, the 
recent reforms of the federal system have done little to change the overall nature of 
intergovernmental relations. Instead, the government has achieved what amounts to 
little more than political appeasement- a reform for reform's sake - in an attempt to 
quell growing public politikverdrossenheit and show that the reformstau can truly be 
broken. 
Still, future efforts at de jure reform of the German federal structure are likely 
to be difficult for several reasons. First, when the German constitution or 
Grundgesetz was drafted in the late 1940s, the empirical study of federalism was far 
more advanced than it was at the end of the eighteenth century when the American 
founding fathers met at the constitutional convention. Federalism was at that time a 
rather ephemeral normative concept of governance, not an established and tested 
system of government, indeed the name itself was not fully decided on. As a result, 
the framers drafted a rather vague constitution that embodied the normative values of 
this "federal" governance which they had decided would be most successful in 
protecting the rights of citizens and preventing democracy from sliding into tyranny 
and was only so specific as to preclude the abuses which had recently been suffered 
by the colonies under the rule of King George and to avoid certain pitfalls of weak 
72 Ibid, 113 
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central government experienced under the short-lived Articles of Confederation. 
The modem German constitution, on the other hand, was drawn up after the 
American "laboratory of federalism" had been operating for more than a century and 
a half. Furthermore, five other developed countries had adopted federal systems in 
the interim, including Germany's World War II cohort and neighbor Austria only a 
few years earlier in 1945. Because of this fact, the German framers had an abundance 
of trial-and-error examples and evidence from a variety of federal approaches to 
governance from which they could easily form a combination of the most successful 
and most appropriate to the German culture, population, regions, and nation as a 
whole. What resulted was the German Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, a "constitution" 
much longer, significantly more legislative, and more based in pragmatism than 
political ideals than the American Constitution. 
The Grundgesetz leaves much less room for extraconstitutional reform and 
other de facto changes, since it enumerates far more about the operation of 
government and the dynamics of intergovernmental relations that the American 
Constitution. Instead, any major evolutions in government are likely to require 
statutory empowerment, a task which is difficult. Granted, the significant 
constitutional hurdles which hinder the amendment of the Grundgesetz have been 
overcome a number of times, but Germany's institutional design poses certain 
problems which stymie any efforts to form the necessary coalition of interests to 
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overcome the constitutional rigidity of the reform process when it comes specifically 
to issues of federal design and intergovernmental relations. 
There is an underlying "thesis" to any reform efforts in the last decade: a 
move toward "competitive federalism" under which the entanglement of federal and 
state government will be trimmed, reducing the scope of concurrent policy areas by 
designating some specifically to the federal sphere and others exclusively to the 
Lander. To make any progress in this respect requires a great deal of compromise as 
to the specific policy areas which will be disentangled and, furthermore, which level 
of government will be excluded from what policy areas. This compromise calls for 
concessions to be made by both the federal government and the Lander. 
Unfortunately, the design of the federal system poses another problem which causes 
infighting within the Lander. Because concurrent powers are exercised by the Lander 
at the federal level via the Bundesrat, the Lander executives, who appoint the 
members of their Land's Bundesrat caucus, exercise significant influence in these 
areas. If and when those powers are removed, the Lander executives stand to lose 
much of their influence either way. If a policy area is reserved to the federal 
government by reform measures, the Lander, and by extension their executives will 
lose any influence in that area. If, on the other hand, a policy area is reserved to the 
Land governments, power over it will be exercised by the state diets, or Landtage, in 
which the Land executives have ironically less influence than they do in the 
Bundesrat. As a result, personal interest and ambition of Lander executives 
controvert the disentanglement sought by the proponents of competitive federalism. 
In fact, there are many examples in recent history where politicians have used the 
post of Ministerprasident as a sort of springboard to higher federal offices.73 
49 
Even if only a perfunctory version of the German goal of uniform social 
provision is to be maintained, measures will have to be undertaken first to 
compensate for some glaring demographic heterogeneity between the Lander. There 
are several ways to do this, but, once again, there seems to be insurmountable 
political opposition in each direction. The first of these options is the ever-divisive 
fiscal equalization process. The citizens of the new Lander continue to earn 
significantly lower wages than their counterparts in former West Germany, and while 
their wages are growing more quickly, the growth rate difference (0.3%) is so small 
and the current annual difference of more than Euro I 0,000 is so large, that, at current 
growth rates, average wages will continue to diverge.74 Lower earning rates in the 
eastern Lander result in lower tax revenue for the administration, making provision of 
73 Matthias Geis, "Jeder fllr sich, keiner fllr alle" ["Everyone for themselves, no one for the people"], 
trans. Erik Weber and Richard Weber, Die Zeit, 22 December 2004, [Magazine archive online] 
available from <http://www.zeit.de/2004/53/Scheitem>; accessed 9 April 2009. 
74 "Bruttoverdienste (Gross earnings)" Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, my translation, [web 
site] available from <http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Intemet/DE/Navigation/ 
Statistiken/ VerdiensteArbeitskosten/Bruttoverdienste/Bruttoverdienste.psml>; accessed 13 April 2009. 
The data of the German Federal Statistical Office is average gross monthly earnings in the 4~ quarter 
of2008 for all of Germany, and also divided by gender, and by former East and West German Lander. 
It should be noted that the earnings reported are without Sonderzahlungen, or bonuses, so I suspect 
that, with a preponderance of service and financial sector jobs concentrated in former West German 
Lander, the real earnings difference is actually greater than conveyed by these statistics. Granted, the 
cost of living in the eastern Lander is, on average, lower than in the West but likely not so much lower 
as to ameliorate the lower income levels. 
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public services difficult and reinforcing the relative poverty of states with higher rates 
of welfare recipients, such as unemployment, to begin with. Fiscal equalization 
measures seek to provide these poorer states with surplus revenue with which to 
institute economic development programs such as job training, factory retooling, 
continuing education, and infrastructure improvements, which will help raise the 
economic competitiveness of these states to the level of the richer Lander more 
quickly than may otherwise have happened. 
The other option to improve the chances of achieving equivalent standards of 
living and economic competitiveness. across the Lander is to redraw the boundaries of 
some smaller and poorer states. This solution is based on a simple argument of 
administrative efficiency. The basic tenet is that administrative overhead in 
government dictates that the cost of governing is not directly proportional to the 
number of people governed. Because all districts, no matter how small require 
certain administrative offices, employees, services, etc., the larger an administrative 
division is, the cheaper it is, per capita, to run. If this concept is applied to the 
German Lander, there are significant conceivable savings to be reaped. Consider 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany's most populous state: with just over 18 million 
citizens, it is more populous than the entire former East German territory, and has 
only about 500,000 inhabitants as the nine smallest Lander combined. Certainly the 
new Lander could stand to benefit from the process of neugliederung, considering 
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that a combined Saxony-Thuringia-Saxony Anhalt state would have slightly more 
inhabitants than Lower Saxony in the west, making it still only the fourth largest 
state. The benefits are not limited to the east, though - combining Saarland with 
neighboring Rhineland-Palatinate, eliminating by far the smallest Flachenland and 
second least populated Land, results in a moderately sized Bundesland both in terms 
of size and area. Unfortunately, the longer the German federal system continues in its 
current incarnation, the more difficult it will be to redraw any Land boundaries. The 
first and only time a neugliederung proposal has been successful was less than a 
decade after the end of World War II, when three southwestern states joined to form 
Baden-Wurttemberg in 1952. Since then, no more attempts in the west have been 
made and the proposed merger of Berlin and Brandenburg in 1996 was turned down 
by the voters. 
Thus we have identified a major challenge in the problem stream: there are 
many poor Lander with small and relatively poor populations and too little area or 
natural resources to foster competitive economic growth and maintain healthy 
industries. We have also discussed two possible solutions in the policy stream: fiscal 
equalization, or neugliederung. We must now determine whether the politics stream 
will converge with the other two streams at one of these two intersections. The 
conclusion is less than encouraging. While the current system of fiscal equalization 
will remain in place for another decade, it is inconceivable that the richer states will 
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allow the program to be renewed for any longer without major concessions. 
Unfortunately these concessions, such as the right to opt-out of certain portions of the 
fiscal equalization programs, will likely only harm the long term goal of nationwide 
regional competitiveness. The discussion of alternatives to the current design of 
fiscal equalization also raises serious questions about the convergence of the politics 
stream. The five Lander who are net payers into the equalization system75 possess 26 
votes in the Bundesrat76, enough to veto any proposed extension of the fiscal 
equalization, while the poorest receiving Lander still have enough votes to veto 
legislation in Bundesrat even if several Lander who are only marginal beneficiaries of 
equalization join the rich states. 
A convergence of the political stream at the neugliederung crux, despite more 
readily tangible benefits of the policy, is probably less likely than a continuation or 
reform of equalization. Keeping in mind that the former East German Lander were 
conceived in the late 1940s only to be eliminated in the GDR, even the Lander which 
had the least connection with any sort of historical region have now existed over half 
a century, giving them plenty of time to develop their own regional identities which 
75 Deutscher Bundesrat, "Zweite Verordnung zur Durchfiihrung des Finanzausgleichs-gesetzes im 
Ausgleichsjahr 2007," 3, my translation [Government publication] (Berlin: Deutscher Bundesrat, 
2008), available from <http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_ 4480/DE/ 
Wirtschaft _ und _ Verwaltung/ Finanz_ und _ Wirtschaftspolitik/Foederale_Finanzbeziehungen/ 
Laenderfinanzausgleich/Endg_ C3 _ BCltige _ 20Abrechnung_ 20LFA _ 202007,templateld=raw,proper 
ty=publicationFile.pdt>; accessed 21 April 2009. 
76 Deutscher Bundesrat, "Bundesrat Stimmenverteilung im Bundesrat," my translation [Web site] 
(Berlin: Detuscher Bundesrat, 2009); available from <http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_099/nn_8328/ 
DE/struktur/stimmenverteilung/stimmenverteilung-node.htrnl>; accessed 21 April 2009. 
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will be difficult to eliminate. Furthermore, given the tendency of administrative self-
preservation, it is difficult to imagine the governments of any Lander to be combined 
approving a measure which would greatly reduce their political influence and 
possibly even eliminate their positions altogether. 
Lander have historically been divided into several administrative regions now 
uniformly called Regierungsbezirke, which are themselves divided into a smaller 
subdivisions, either classified as Landkreise, state districts something like the 
administrative counties found in numerous American states, or Kreisfreie Stadte, 
district-free cities which constitute their own administrative unit. Interestingly 
enough three of the sixteen Lander, beginning with Rhineland-Palatinate in 2000, 
followed by Saxony-Anhalt in 2004, and Lower Saxony in 2005, have recently 
disbanded their Regierungsbezirke.11 Lower Saxony specifically cited the reduction 
of personnel costs as the primary reason for this reform, estimating that 6,700 
positions could be cut by eliminating the three-tiered administrative structure of the 
state, the savings from which would ostensibly allow the Land to balance its budget 
within five years. 78 While the savings figures were criticized as overstated, still, two 
points can be taken from this example and others. First, the Lander, lacking any 
independent power of taxation, must work within the confines of externally 
77 Jfirg Bogumil and Steffen Kottmann, "Verwaltungsstrukturreform - die Abschaffung der 
Bezirksregierungen in Niedersachsen" in Schriflenreihe der Stiflung Westfalen-lniliative Band 11, 
(MUnster: IbbenbUrener Vereinsdruckerei GmbH, 2006), my translation [Journal online] available from 




determined revenue, which leads to creative savings methods, such as the reduction of 
administrative divisions in this case. Second, Lander are undertaking their own form 
of neugliederung to improve efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery and to 
cut costs of administration. Perhaps if these efforts are shown in the future to have 
been successful in their intentions, this will bolster the case for reducing the number 
of administrative divisions at the federal level through several mergers of current 
Lander. 
Prognosis for the future 
Although [Wolfgang Rensch] agrees with Jeffery's perception of an increasing 
disentanglement of German federalism, if not formally, then at least de facto, 
[he] argues that German federalism still qualifies as largely cooperative: 
hardly any federation goes as far as the German one when it comes to 
centralizing legislative but decentralizing executive authority. 79 
Despite all the public dissatisfaction with and resultant political animosity 
toward the cooperative prerogatives of the federal and state governments in Germany, 
reform attempts have been largely unsuccessful in precipitating any significant 
changes in the central legislative authority of the Bund. This stagnation can be 
attributed to, and is, to the frustration of the German public, likely to continue 
because of a preponderance of conflicting interests which seem to thwart major 
attempts at intergovernmental reform in Germany. 
The design of the Bundesrat representation produces an inherent conflict of 
79 Umbach, "Introduction," 10. 
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interest in any attempt to reduce the importance of Bundesrat consent in federal law-
and policy-making. Representation of the Lander by members of their executive 
complicates the politics of reform by introducing personal interests which may cause 
the rational choice decisions of Bundesrat members to diverge from rational choices 
of best interest to the institutions they represent. Barring an unlikely majority of 
altruistic Ministerprasidenten and other Land cabinet members, with no political 
aspirations of their own, it is difficult to conceive of the Lander executives voting to 
diminish their own political power at the federal level, especially if the result is to 
cede it back to their colleagues, and often political opponents, in the Landrat. 
Both solace and alarm can be taken at the distinct possibility that changes will 
have to be undertaken out of necessity at some point in the relatively near future. 
Much like small and inefficient companies find it difficult to survive in competition 
with larger, more streamlined businesses, smaller, poor Lander will find themselves 
in increasingly difficult economic situations, especially if, as the politics stream 
seems to indicate will happen, the Finanzausgleich system is allowed to expire or 
renewed only with major concessions. The result will be the eventual political and 
economic necessity of neug/iederung, just as small businesses merge or a bought up 
by other companies looking to increase efficiency and cut costs. 
German Federalism in a Europe of the Regions 
Framed in a European setting, "federalism" raises a wide variety of reactions 
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from Europeans. Since the 1980s, federalism has been associated across the continent 
with the gradual relinquishing of state sovereignty to a pan-European amalgam of 
supranational political institutions. The American post-war globalization experience 
has been quite differently framed, especially since the most demanding global 
institution it has joined, the UN, has nowhere near the requirements that the European 
Union does. Furthermore, from a semantic perspective, the term federalism has 
rarely been attached to such supranational bodies in American discourse. 
An increasingly integrated Europe raises new challenges for a slowly evolving 
German federal system. Similar to the American experience of the states' creative 
involvement in international trade and economic development before Congress can 
legislate, it seems that the Lander have used their degree of influence at the federal 
level by giving or withholding consent in the Bundesrat as bargaining chip to gain 
access to the European policy-making forum before the Bund can get its proverbial 
ducks in a row. As Germany, being one of the strongest proponents of a united 
Europe, projects its Federal"history and institutional preference on to the European 
Union, the effects come full circle. In the 80s and 90s, the Lander found themselves 
somewhat endangered as the European Union took shape and more and more national 
sovereignty was transferred to Brussels. The Lander watched as a number of the 
powers transferred by the federal government to the EU came from traditional Lander 
competencies. So the Lander have gone back to the German government demanding 
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restitution for their loss in power. The Lander have been willing to concede some 
policy areas previously reserved to them to the European Parliament via the federal 
government in exchange for increased influence in the European Council of 
Ministers. While this would seem on the surface to weaken the Lander in the larger 
scheme, it may, in actuality be a very judicious political power play. If the Lander 
perceive the fight for more legislative responsibility within Germany as lost to the 
federal government, they may feel that the European Union offers a new "theater" in 
which to continue this battle. Suppose the Lander have conceded the fight to wrest 
policy-making freedom from the federal government as an unending battle of 
conflicting interests, political gridlock, and hopelessly entangled policy areas, then 
the nascent European forum offers them an opportunity to gain influence vis-a-vis the 
federation. Within Germany, the Lander independence is limited by the federation, 
resulting in a inherent disadvantage when fighting for policy-making powers. In the 
European Union, on the other hand, the Federation, as well as the Lander are subject 
to limits placed on them by the supranational legislative body. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty means that a more 
powerful European Union may very well translate to increased policy-making 
independence in the Lander at the expense of the federal government. Some 
observers have even argued that, of the three levels of government in modem 
European politics, the national level is likely to "atrophy" first. 80 If the principle of 
80 Gunlicks, "Gennan Federalism After Unification," 98. 
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subsidiarity continues to underpin a "Europe of the Regions," as countries relinquish 
more and more sovereignty to the EU, the regions stand to regain some of their 
sovereignty under the guise of policy making prerogatives. 
The twenty years since reunification have produced unsatisfactory results 
from the current systems of politikverjlechtung andfinanzausgleich. Thus, whether 
through the subsidiarity of the European Union or gradual movement towards more 
competitive federalism at home, the Lander are in desperate need of an infusion of 
responsibility, government wide, as opposed to the current concentration of influence 
and responsibility in the veto-wielding Lander executives. The unified markets-
labor, currency and goods-of the European Union demand creative policy-making 
approaches to problems new and old. The American states have adapted to similar 
conditions under free-trade agreements such as NAFTA, implementing local incentive 
packages to attract domestic and foreign investment. It is high time the 
Bundesrepublik gave the Lander an opportunity to attempt similar policy measures. 
Conclusion 
In the American experience, the term Federalism very much embodies a 
theoretical political ideology in Skocpol's sense. To adhere to federalism was to 
believe in the virtues of separate spheres of power as a protection against tyranny. 
Furthermore, federalism is, in the collective American mind, a unique American 
invention, emphasized by the demi-god status which the Founders have achieved in 
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both political and popular discourse. 
Quite on the contrary, German Foderalismus has, throughout history, been a 
rather practical manifestation. Federalism in Germany is a function of unique 
historical regionalism applied to political circumstances at various times throughout 
history. The result has been a "pragmatic federalism" informed more by policy goals 
than by political ideals. As the validity of these policy goals is challenged, so too is 
the federal design. 
While there are a number of differences in the federal experience of the 
United States and that of German history, one similarity stands out when assessing the 
future course of federalism in each country. Much like the American discourse about 
"new federalism" versus "creative federalism" or "new nationalism," there is a 
general disagreement, it seems, among German political scholars and observers as to 
the status of German federalism as well as the best or most likely path for the future. 
As the argument between classical cooperative federalism and new competitive 
federalism continues to grow, what becomes more apparent is the conflict of ideas 
behind these two designs. It emphasizes the growing contentiousness of, and waning 
desire for common standards ofliving and policy provision across the federation, the 
goal which has underpinned cooperative federalism of the previous half-century. This 
consensus-seeking and uniformity is being challenged by the ideas of autonomy, 
differentiation and subsidiarity which have fueled the appeal of competitive 
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federalism. 81 
What is clear is that the American and (modem) German forms of federalism 
began on seemingly opposite ends of a theoretical spectrum of federalism, and have, 
over the course of their respective histories, grown closer. The American design 
began with very distinct spheres of power for the federal and state governments, 
cautiously reserving powers not explicitly delegated to the federal government to the 
states or the people; there was an emphatic protection of an independent state role in 
government. The German Grundgesetz, on the other hand, designed a thoroughly 
intertwined system of powers and intergovernmental relations between the Bund and 
the Lander, in which the states retained little independence and were primarily 
politically relevant only insofar as the role they played in law-making at the federal 
level. 
While the American system has experienced increasing centralization of 
legislative powers in the federal government, primarily under the auspices of 
Supreme Court decisions protecting federal powers of commerce and foreign affairs, 
the result is an increasing interdependence and complexity of intergovernmental 
affairs. From the other side of the spectrum, the German federal system has, albeit 
slowly, begun to disentangle its complex system of intergovernmental cooperation, 
often citing the American system as an example of successful implementation of more 
politically independent states. What results and where this thesis concludes is that 
81 Jeffery, "Gennan Federalism from Cooperation to Competition," 183. 
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there is an increasing need for, and usefulness of in-depth comparisons of the two 
systems. Perhaps lessons can be learned on both sides of the Atlantic if the Germans 
share their pragmatism in exchange for an infusion of American "separate spheres" 
federal ideology. 
Appendix A- Glossary of German terms and, where applicable, their 
American equivalents 
(Bundes)Land!Lander-the (sixteen) immediate subdivisions of the Federal Republic 
of Germany; comparable in function and status to the American states. 
Bund - a term generally used to refer to the federal government as opposed to a Land 
government. 
Bundesrat- literally "Federal Council"; the second house of German parliament in 
which each Land is represented by members of its executive, and may cast 
between 3 and 6 votes depending on population; while many compare it to the 
Senate, it does not function as an upper house, and therefore comparisons should 
be made with caution 
Bundestag- literally "Federal Diet"; the main house of German parliament in which 
members are either elected to district-based single seats or appointed by a political 
party based on a proportional representation scheme; similarities with the House of 
Representatives are much more apparent than between the Bundesrat and Senate, 
though comparisons with other parliamentary system legislatures, e.g. Britain's 
House of Commons, might be more appropriate 
Finanzausgleich - the general term for fiscal equalization schemes. The transfer of 
surplus tax revenue from richer to poorer Lander is often more specifically 
referred to as Landerjinanzausgleich 
Fodera/ism us - the german term translated as "federalism" 
Grundgesetz - the German "Basic Law" which secures right and freedoms of citizens 
and establishes the form of government; comparable to US Constitution. 
Kooperativer Foderalismus - a term in German federalism literature which translates 
literally to cooperative federalism 
Landtag- the general term for the unicameral legislatures of the Lander 
Neugliederung- territorial consolidation, reorganization or redrawing of boundaries 
Politikverjlechtung- entanglement of federal and state responsibility in certain policy 
areas; similar to Laurence O'Toole's "interdependence" discussed in American 
Intergovernmental Relations 
Politikverdrossenheit - public disenchantment with politics 
Wettbewerbsfederalismus - a term in the German federalism literature which is 
analogous to the English term competitive federalism 
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